Keynes’s Epistemology and Economic Methodology

Abstract

For most of us, the notion of epistemology is somewhat daunting. As a ‘theory of knowledge’ or (etymologically more correct) ‘theory of science’, epistemology seems to operate at a rarefied level, far removed from applied economics. In the hands of some (e.g. McCloskey, 1989), it performs the objectionable role of setting out the ground rules for economic method, thereby limiting the scope for enquiry by practising economists. In this form, epistemology is at least separable from the levels of method, theory and the object of theory, and thus relatively easy to identify. In Keynes’s hands epistemology was not separable; it imbued, and was imbued by, his methodology, his theory, his policy prescriptions and his perception of real economic processes. Indeed it is in the nature of his epistemology that it should do so. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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