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Knowledge as a public good: efficient sharing and incentives for development effort
12 references·5 citing·42 second hop
Knowledge as a public good: efficient sharing and incentives for development effort (1998)Knowledge as a public good: efficient sha…The Management of Innovation (1994)The Management of InnovationThe Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information (1994)The Folk Theorem with Imperfe…Research Joint Ventures and R&D Cartels (1992)Research Joint Ventures and R…Optimal Contracts for Teams (1991)Optimal Contracts for TeamsCooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly With Spillovers (1988)Cooperative and Noncooperativ…Competition for Agency Contracts (1987)Competition for Agency Contra…Auctioning Incentive Contracts (1987)Auctioning Incentive ContractsAn Analysis of Cooperative Research and Development (1986)An Analysis of Cooperative Re…Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents (1984)Optimal incentive contracts w…Cost Reduction, Competition, and Industry Performance (1984)Cost Reduction, Competition, …Moral Hazard in Teams (1982)Moral Hazard in TeamsIncentives and incomplete information (1979)Incentives and incomplete inf…Knowledge management in Chinese organizations: collectivist values for open-minded discussions (2011)Knowledge management in Chine…Internet Knowledge-Sharing System Based on Object-Oriented (2008)Internet Knowledge-Sharing Sy…Do multinationals feed local development and growth (2007)Do multinationals feed local …Strategic Information Revelation in an R&D Race with Spillovers (2004)Strategic Information Revelat…Facilitating knowledge transfer in organizations through incentive alignment and IT investment (2004)Facilitating knowledge transf…Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem (1983)Subgame Perfect Implementation (1988)Chapter 2 The theory of the firm (1989)Chapter 27 Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation (2007)Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention (1962)The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration (1986)Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design (1991)Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand? (1999)Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis (2002)Corporate governance and the rise of integrating corporate social responsibility criteria in executive compensation: Effectiveness and implications for firm outcomes (2019)MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION AND OPTIMUM PRODUCT DIVERSITY (1975)Product Selection, Fixed Costs, and Monopolistic Competition (1976)Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods (1979)Chapter 18 Empirical studies of innovation and market structure (1989)Innovation and Productivity: Evidence from Six Latin American Countries (2011)Why Regulate Utilities? (1968)Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies-in General and with Respect to CATV (1976)A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm (1984)Regulation, Competition, and Liberalization (2006)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)Incentives in Teams (1973)Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal (1983)Eliciting Informative Feedback: The Peer-Prediction Method (2005)An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design (2015)Games and Decisions (2015)Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information (1984)On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria (1986)On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting (1988)A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem (2008)Formal Contracts in the Presence of Relational Enforcement Mechanisms: Evidence from Technology Development Projects (2009)Cognitive systems for revenge and forgiveness (2012)Corporate Equity Ownership, Strategic Alliances, and Product Market Relationships (2000)1 Moving Beyond Schumpeter: Management Research on the Determinants of Technological Innovation (2008)Corporate Innovation Along the Supply Chain (2018)Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)General purpose technologies ‘Engines of growth’? (1995)A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action Presidential Address, American political Science Association, 1997 (2010)R&D Cooperation and Spillovers: Some Empirical Evidence from Belgium (2002)R&D cooperation and innovation activities of firms—evidence for the German manufacturing industry (2003)Do subsidies to commercial R&D reduce market failures? Microeconometric evaluation studies (2000)INNOVATION AND COMPETITIVE PRESSURE* (2008)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1982Moral Hazard in Teams4,992 cited
  • 1988Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly With Spillovers2,047 cited
  • 1994The Management of Innovation1,232 cited
  • 1992Research Joint Ventures and R&D Cartels1,207 cited
  • 1979Incentives and incomplete information795 cited
  • 1984Cost Reduction, Competition, and Industry Performance795 cited
  • 1986An Analysis of Cooperative Research and Development792 cited
  • 1994The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information768 cited
  • 1987Auctioning Incentive Contracts359 cited
  • 1984Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents317 cited
  • 1987Competition for Agency Contracts246 cited
  • 1991Optimal Contracts for Teams223 cited

Cited by

  • 2007Do multinationals feed local development and growth53 cited
  • 2011Knowledge management in Chinese organizations: collectivist values for open-minded discussions18 cited
  • 2004Facilitating knowledge transfer in organizations through incentive alignment and IT investment14 cited
  • 2004Strategic Information Revelation in an R&D Race with Spillovers

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13 cited
  • 2008Internet Knowledge-Sharing System Based on Object-Oriented12 cited