Libertarian Accounts of Free Will

Abstract

Abstract Libertarian accounts of free will face objections that the indeterminism they require would leave behavior random, inexplicable, and beyond agents’ control. This book examines three main types of libertarian views—noncausal, event-causal, and agent-causal—to see how well they can meet such challenges. Noncausal accounts are found not to offer satisfactory views of action and reason-explanation. Event-causal and agent-causal accounts are defended against a number of objections. But if both free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism, then there is no adequate account of free will.

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