Most empirical studies concerning franchise systems have dealt with the monetary contractual provisions, especially with the determinants of royalty rates. But the organizational design of franchised chains has received less attention and dual distribution is still a misunderstood phenomenon in economic theory. What determines the proportion of companyowned units or franchised units within a chain? How does the level of the royalty rate interplay with the extent of company ownership? This paper supports the idea that dual distribution enables to mitigate contractual hazards due to information asymmetry and incomplete contracting. Thus a chain's efficiency should strongly depend on the correct balance between royalty rates and the extent of company ownership. The interdependence between these two strategic decisions is analyzed by using a panel data set of 745 French franchisors. Econometric tests show that brand name value has a positive impact both on royalty rates and the proportion of companyowned units. Moreover, we put forth evidence that royalties and company ownership are complementary variables for the organizational design of chains.
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