CONSISTENT DYNAMICE CHOICE AND NON-EXPECTED UTILITY PREFERENCES

André Lapied · Pascal Toquebeuf

3 citations0/0 files storedRePEc: Research Papers in Economics

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Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics Game Theory and Applications Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Abstract

Pursuing works from Sarin and Wakker (1998), we study how NonExpected Utility models could be consistently applied to multi-stage decision problems. Concerning multiple priors model, we remove the argument that dynamic consistency, consequentialism and model consistency (sequential consistency in Sarin and Wakker (1998)) can all be preserved. Like Choquet expected utility, deviation of expected utility is only allowed over the final stage. Moreover, it's proved for the two models that if we also assume reduction of compound acts, then an expected utility representation exists in all stages.

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References

1989Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior 1978Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty and Dynamic Choice Theory 2003Recursive multiple-priors 1989Dynamic Consistency and Non-expected Utility Models of Choice under Uncertainty 1993Updating Ambiguous Beliefs 1990Two-Stage Lotteries without the Reduction Axiom 1988Consequentialist foundations for expected utility 2001Risk, Ambiguity, and the Separation of Utility and Beliefs

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