Is More ‘Brussels’ the Solution? New European Union Member States' Preferences about the European Financial Architecture*

Abstract

Abstract The changes in the European financial architecture in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis have highlighted the tension between the need for greater centralization of financial regulation at the EU level and the reluctance of some Member States to give up national regulatory autonomy. This article analyses the attitudes of new EU Member States toward the EU financial regulatory reforms. It investigates whether the extent of foreign ownership in the domestic financial sector, Euroscepticism, government support for deregulation and recent experiences of a severe financial crisis have an impact on countries' reservations. According to the results of the analysis, the higher the foreign ownership of a country's financial sector, the more reservations it expresses. The Eurosceptic attitude of the political parties in government matters as well. The more the governing political parties are opposed to EU integration in general, the more reservations one finds in a country's official position on the new EU financial architecture.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 43 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.