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The Mind's Awareness of Itself
2 references·14 citing·42 second hop
The Mind's Awareness of Itself (1999)The Mind's Awareness of ItselfNaturalizing The Mind (1995)Naturalizing The MindWhat Mary Didn't Know (1986)What Mary Didn't KnowIntrospection: First-Person Access in Science and Agency , by Maja Spener (2025)Introspection: First-Person A…Law and Self-Knowledge in the Talmud (2018)Law and Self-Knowledge in the…Perceptual Consciousness as a Mental Activity (2017)Perceptual Consciousness as a…Dignāga on Reflexive Awareness (2015)Dignāga on Reflexive AwarenessTransparency, qualia realism and representationalism (2013)Transparency, qualia realism …Affect: representationalists’ headache (2013)Affect: representationalists’…A New Framework for Conceptualism (2010)A New Framework for Conceptua…Is Feeling Pain the Perception of Something? (2009)Is Feeling Pain the Perceptio…WHAT CHANGE BLINDNESS TEACHES ABOUT CONSCIOUSNESS* (2007)WHAT CHANGE BLINDNESS TEACHES…Sensory Awareness Is not a Wide Physical Relation: An Empirical Argument Against Externalist Intentionalism1 (2006)Sensory Awareness Is not a Wi…The Argument from Diaphanousness (2004)The Argument from Diaphanousn…Some Foundational Problems in the Scientific Study of Pain (2002)Some Foundational Problems in…Integrating experiential–phenomenological methods and neuroscience to study neural mechanisms of pain and consciousness (2002)Integrating experiential–phen…An Analysis of Pleasure Vis-a-Vis Pain (2000)An Analysis of Pleasure Vis-a…Laws and Symmetry (1989)The Intrinsic Quality of Experience (1990)The Concept of Mind (2006)ATTENTION AND MENTAL PAINT 1 (2010)The Epistemic Role of Consciousness (2019)The conscious mind: in search of a fundamental theory (1996)Consciousness, Color, and Content (2000)Can the physicalist explain colour structure in terms of colour experience?1 (2006)Kripke's Argument Against Materialism (2010)Reliable misrepresentation and tracking theories of mental representation (2012)Knowledge and the Flow of Information. (1983)Attitudinal and Phenomenological Theories of Pleasure (2018)Reasons and theories of sensory affect (2018)Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (1998)Fifty Shades of Affective Colouring of Perception (2021)Human Motives (2024)Ten Problems of Consciousness (1995)PAINS AND REASONS: WHY IT IS RATIONAL TO KILL THE MESSENGER (2014)The Limitations of Perceptual Transparency (2016)Everything is clear: All perceptual experiences are transparent (2019)Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science (1956)A MATERIALIST THEORY OF THE MIND (1968)Consciousness Explained. (1993)ATTENTION, SEEING, AND CHANGE BLINDNESS (2010)The myth of phenomenological overflow (2011)The Grain of Vision and the Grain of Attention (2012)Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories (1984)Knowledge and Its Limits (2000)Knowledge and its Limits (2002)Believing in Perceiving: Known Illusions and the Classical Dual‐Component Theory (2015)The Intellectual Given (2015)Why Externalist Representationalism is a Form of Disjunctivism (2017)Mind and World (1994)Rethinking the senses and their interactions: the case for sensory pluralism (2014)A materialist theory of the mind (2017)Mental Imagery (2023)On a confusion about a function of consciousness (1995)Simulating Minds (2006)Consciousness as Integrated Information: a Provisional Manifesto (2008)Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness (1998)The Transparency of Experience (2002)Origins of Objectivity (2010)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1995Naturalizing The Mind2,021 cited
  • 1986What Mary Didn't Know1,465 cited

Cited by

  • 2004The Argument from Diaphanousness135 cited
  • 2013Transparency, qualia realism and representationalism118 cited
  • 2009Is Feeling Pain the Perception of Something?118 cited
  • 2007WHAT CHANGE BLINDNESS TEACHES ABOUT CONSCIOUSNESS*83 cited
  • 2013Affect: representationalists’ headache81 cited
  • 2006Sensory Awareness Is not a Wide Physical Relation: An Empirical Argument Against Externalist Intentionalism181 cited
  • 2000An Analysis of Pleasure Vis-a-Vis Pain54 cited
  • 2010A New Framework for Conceptualism51 cited
  • 2002Integrating experiential–phenomenological methods and neuroscience to study neural mechanisms of pain and consciousness45 cited
  • 2002Some Foundational Problems in the Scientific Study of Pain42 cited
  • 2017Perceptual Consciousness as a Mental Activity36 cited
  • 2015Dignāga on Reflexive Awareness5 cited
  • 2018Law and Self-Knowledge in the Talmud5 cited
  • 2025Introspection: First-Person Access in Science and Agency , by Maja Spener

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