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Ex-Post Incentive Compatible Mechanism Design · Study

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PreprintEx-Post Incentive Compatible Mechanism Design

Jeffrey C. Ely2002

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Preprintgreen2002

Ex-Post Incentive Compatible Mechanism Design

Jeffrey C. Ely · Kim‐Sau Chung

72 citations·0/0 files stored·RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

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Auction Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Game Theory and Applications

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References

1983Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading 1979Incentives and incomplete information 2005Robust Mechanism Design 1985Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent 2001Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations 1992Correlated Information and Mecanism Design 2002Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design 1992Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules

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2006A Budget-Balanced, Incentive-Compatible Scheme for Social Choice 2005Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms 2003On the hardness of optimal auctions 2014General Truthfulness Characterizations via Convex Analysis 2013Optimal and near-optimal mechanism design with interdependent values 2014Approximate revenue maximization in interdependent value settings

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2001Partnerships, Lemons and Efficient Tradereport · 10 shared references 2005Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanismsreport · 10 shared references 2011Robust Mechanism Designbook · 8 shared references 2004The Unity of Auction Theory: Milgrom's Masterclassother · 7 shared references 2006The Limits of ex post Implementationarticle · 6 shared references 2004Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiencyarticle · 6 shared references

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Year2002

Typepreprint

Published2002-02-01

VenueRePEc: Research Papers in Economics

Languageen

Citations72

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ShelfAuction Theory and Applications

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2015Implementation with interdependent valuations

2017Taking turns