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Should aid reward good outcomes? Optimal contracts in a repeated moral hazard model of foreign aid allocation
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Should aid reward good outcomes? Optimal contracts in a repeated moral hazard model of foreign aid allocation (2006)Should aid reward good outcomes? Optimal …Who Deserves Aid? Equality of Opportunity, International Aid, and Poverty Reduction (2006)Who Deserves Aid? Equality of…On the Empirics of Foreign Aid and Growth (2004)On the Empirics of Foreign Ai…Why conditional aid does not work and what can be done about it? (2003)Why conditional aid does not …Contracting for aid (2003)Contracting for aidOn Aid, Growth and Good Policies (2001)On Aid, Growth and Good Polic…Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why? (2000)Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom…Political Economy in Macroeconomics (2000)Political Economy in Macroeco…Lobbying by Ethnic Groups and Aid Allocation (2000)Lobbying by Ethnic Groups and…Aid effectiveness disputed (2000)Aid effectiveness disputedAid allocation, poverty reduction and theAssessing Aid report (2000)Aid allocation, poverty reduc…Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts (1990)Moral Hazard and Renegotiatio…Does Aid Work (1986)Does Aid WorkRepeated Moral Hazard (1985)Repeated Moral HazardLong-Term Contracts and Moral Hazard (1983)Long-Term Contracts and Moral…Moral Hazard in Teams (1982)Moral Hazard in TeamsAid, Policies, and GrowthAid, Policies, and GrowthMoral Hazard and Observability (1979)Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship (1979)An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem (1983)Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity: Comment (2004)Chapter 27 Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation (2007)The Simple Microeconomics of Public‐Private Partnerships (2014)The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems (1985)Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device (1986)Salaries and Piece Rates (1986)Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships (1990)Optimal Indirect and Capital Taxation (2003)Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts (1981)Aid and Growth: What Does the Cross-Country Evidence Really Show? (2005)What did structural adjustment adjust?The association of policies and growth with repeated IMF and World Bank adjustment loans (2005)Aid Effectiveness—Opening the Black Box (2007)Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogeneous Growth (1990)Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration (1995)INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: CROSS‐COUNTRY TESTS USING ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES (1995)Aid and growth regressions (2001)Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth? (2003)A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth (1992)I Just Ran Two Million Regressions (1997)Endogenous Growth Theory (1999)Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth (1986)Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations (1991)Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models (1998)Aid and Growth: What Does the Cross-Country Evidence Really Show? (2008)The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation: Reply (2012)Economic growth and income inequality (2000-15) (2018)Politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid (1996)Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from United Nations Voting Data (2013)US Food Aid and Civil Conflict (2014)A SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF CROSS-COUNTRY GROWTH REGRESSIONS (1991)Democracy and dictatorship revisited (2009)Uncertainty about Government Policy and Stock Prices (2012)Political uncertainty and risk premia (2013)Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)General purpose technologies ‘Engines of growth’? (1995)A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action Presidential Address, American political Science Association, 1997 (2010)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1982Moral Hazard in Teams4,992 cited
  • n.d.Aid, Policies, and Growth4,010 cited
  • 2000Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?2,585 cited
  • 2000Political Economy in Macroeconomics1,588 cited
  • 2004On the Empirics of Foreign Aid and Growth963 cited
  • 2000Aid effectiveness disputed882 cited
  • 1985Repeated Moral Hazard614 cited
  • 2001On Aid, Growth and Good Policies540 cited
  • 1990Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts410 cited
  • 2003Why conditional aid does not work and what can be done about it?350 cited
  • 1983Long-Term Contracts and Moral Hazard322 cited
  • 1986Does Aid Work292 cited
  • 2003Contracting for aid217 cited
  • 2000Lobbying by Ethnic Groups and Aid Allocation125 cited
  • 2006Who Deserves Aid? Equality of Opportunity, International Aid, and Poverty Reduction82 cited
  • 2000Aid allocation, poverty reduction and theAssessing Aid report66 cited

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