Schizophrenia and the narrative self

Abstract

In this study of schizophrenia and narrative identity, the author begins with a description of narrative identity and a discussion of the debate over narrative identity: a debate that pits theorists arguing that narrative structures are embedded in lived life against those claiming that self-narratives are fictive structures that bear no relation to life as actually lived. The author defends a centrist position that finds narrative identity in part emerging from the life of the individual and in part constructed by the individual. Against the background of this discussion he then presents the histories of three schizophrenic patients. The first is an example of a highly fragmented self-narrative. The second is a delusional self-narrative. Finally, the third history is that of a woman struggling over whether to think of herself in terms of a schizophrenic ‘illness’ narrative. Introduction In addressing the narrative self in schizophrenia, I will begin with the broader topic of the self as such. Contemporary discussions of the self divide into positions that view the self as an essence or substance and those that view it as a construct. The notion of self as essence or substance implies that there is something like a human nature that dictates the course of self-development through the life span. Philosophically, Aristotle is the central figure at the origin of this point of view; he argued that man has a ‘form’ which he realizes over the course of a life.

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