Mixed duopoly, privatization, and subsidization with excess burden of taxation

Toshihiro Matsumura · Yoshihiro Tomaru

74 citations0/0 files storedCanadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d économique

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Merger and Competition Analysis Economic and Fiscal Studies Corporate Taxation and Avoidance

Abstract

Abstract We investigate optimal tax‐subsidy policies in mixed and private oligopolies with excess burden of taxation. We compare the optimal subsidies and the resulting welfare levels among four regimes: mixed and private Cournot duopolies and Stackelberg competition with public and private leaderships. We show that, in contrast to the existing works on the privatization neutrality theorem, privatization affects resulting welfare.

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1994A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation 1989A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games.1986Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms 1984The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look 1990Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or cournot equilibria 1998Partial privatization in mixed duopoly 1996A Mixed Oligopoly in the Presence of Foreign Private Firms 1998Mixed Oligopoly, Privatization, and Strategic Trade Policy

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2015Strategic Privatization with Tariffs and Environmental Taxes in an International Mixed Duopoly

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