A learning-based model of repeated games with incomplete informationJuin-Kuan Chong, Colin F. Camerer, Teck‐Hua Ho2005-07-19articleGames and Economic Behavior53 citationsclosedNo readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesGame Theory and ApplicationsInnovative Teaching Methodologies in Social SciencesAbstractNo abstract was published for this record.Citations in this libraryStored only when both papers are in the corpus — 53 citations exist upstream.References2000Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity1982Reputation and imperfect information1990Corporate culture and economic theory1999Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games1988Bubbles, Crashes, and Endogenous Expectations in Experimental Spot Asset Markets1992An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game1986End behavior in sequences of finite Prisoner's Dilemma supergames A learning theory approach1993Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Experimental EvidenceCited by2012Pattern recognition and subjective belief learning in a repeated constant-sum game