Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review

2002-01-01articleThe Journal of Human Resources1,104 citationsclosed

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Public Policy and Administration Research Public Administration and Governance Economic Theory and Institutions

Abstract

The paper begins with a brief overview of the theory of incentives, with special attention to issues that are important in the public sector, in general and human capital in particular. It then reviews some case studies and empirical studies of incentives in the public sector, examining how these studies relate to the theory. Some implications for reform and design of organizations are drawn.

Citations in this library

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References

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