Disciplined Discretion: Monetary Targeting in Germany and Switzerland

Thomas Laubach · Adam S. Posen

35 citations0/0 files storedRePEc: Research Papers in Economics

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Monetary Policy and Economic Impact European Monetary and Fiscal Policies German Economic Analysis & Policies

Abstract

This essay offers an analysis of actual German and Swiss monetary policy that explains this gap between operation and performance. It shows that neither country's central bank can be called a monetary targeter, according to a strict, formal definition of targeting, and it argues that the historical record shows a different use for announced monetary targets in these countries.

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