The specie standard that prevailed before 1914 was a contingent rule.Under the rule specie convertibility could be suspended in the event of a well understood, exogenously produced emergency, such as a war, on the understanding that after the emergency had safely passed convertibility would be restored at the original parity.Market agents would regard successful adherence as evidence of a credible commitment and would allow the authorities access to seigniorage and bond finance at favorable terms.This paper surveys the history of the specie standard as a contingent rule for 21 countries divided into core and peripheral countries.As a comparison we also briefly consider the Bretton Woods system and the recent managed floating regime.We offer some evidence on capital flows 1865 to 1914 from England to two countries of recent settlement --Argentina and the United States -during episodes of both suspension and adherence to convertibility.It suggests that adherence to the rule may have had some influence on the decision by England to invest abroad.We then present evidence across four regimes (pre-1914 gold standard; interwar gold standard; Bretton Woods; the subsequent managed exchange rate float) for the 21 countries on the stability of macro variables as well as on demand shocks (reflecting policy actions specific to the regime) and supply shocks (reflecting shocks to the environment independent of the regime).These measures allow us to determine whether adherents to the rule consistently pursued different policy actions from nonadherents, and whether persistent adverse shocks to the environment may, for some countries, have precluded adherence to the rule.
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