Articlegreen1992

Overhead Allocation and Incentives for Cost Minimization in Defense Procurement.

76 citations0/0 files storedThe Accounting Review

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance Accounting and Organizational Management Defense, Military, and Policy Studies

Abstract

Abstract Explains how two features of regulatory process create a significant incentive for defense firms to choose inefficient production methods. Variations of the marginal impact of accounting cost on product prices; Calculating the cost of the product; Cost allocation; Costing manipulation; Defense procurement.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 76 citations exist upstream.

References

1963The Weapons Acquisition Process: An Economic Analysis

Cited by

1994Economic Incentives and the Defense Procurement Process 1996Economic calculation and the limits of organization 2004Do Real Options Lead to Escalation of Commitment?2000Cost allocation in Britain: towards an institutional analysis 1998Competition, Efficiency, and Cost Allocation in Government Agencies: Evidence on the Federal Reserve System 2006Procurement contracting strategies 1998Star wars at the bottom line: The accounting forum for defense contractors 1998THE UNRELATED BUSINESS INCOME TAX, COST ALLOCATION, AND PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCY

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.