Science and Skepticism

Abstract

Very little scholarly attention has been devoted to Part 1 of Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.1 This lack has been addressed recently by Tweyman, who argues for the importance of this part in understanding the positions defended by the characters in the remainder of the dialogue,2 in accordance with the types that Hume discusses in part 12 of the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding3—Cleanthes is philosophical dogmatist who requires the application of excessive skepticism by Philo to turn to the approved position of mitigated skepticism, while Demea is and remains religious dogmatist. In the present paper I will address the question of why the Dialogues continues beyond Part 1 in the face of the statement by Philo, who is generally considered to be Hume's spokesperson in the dialogue, that the inquiry being undertaken—the investigation into the nature of the Deity—is beyond human reason. According to Philo, human reason ought not to conduct inquiries into subjects such as theology, whose objects of study are too great for, or beyond, human experience. It would seem, then, that if Philo's position is the acceptable one, the dialogue should not take place at all—determining the nature of the Deity is just not an appropriate exercise for human reason. According to Cleanthes, however, there is parallel between theological inquiries and those of other, accepted sciences where evidence is presented and appropriate conclusions drawn in proportion to that evidence. Rejecting an equality between sciences is a plain proof of prejudice and passion, as there is no rational basis for that rejection.

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