Transparency Versus Constructive Ambiguity in Foreign Exchange InterventionPriscilla Chiu2007-01-01preprintSSRN Electronic Journal67 citationsgreenNo readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.Global Financial Crisis and PoliciesMonetary Policy and Economic ImpactBanking stability, regulation, efficiencyAbstractNo abstract was published for this record.Citations in this libraryStored only when both papers are in the corpus — 67 citations exist upstream.References2000Fear of Floating1986A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information1993The Effectiveness of Central-Bank Intervention: A Survey of the Literature After 19822002The Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrangements: A Reinterpretation1981The role of official intervention1997Informed Traders, Intervention, and Price Leadership: A Deeper View of the Microstructure of the Foreign Exchange Market2012Monetary Policy Frameworks in a Global Context1993Does Foreign Exchange Intervention WorkCited by2006On the inadequacy of newswire reports for empirical research on foreign exchange interventions2007The influence of actual and unrequited interventions2006Why do central banks intervene secretly?2013The effectiveness of forex interventions in four Latin American countries2005Rules Versus Discretion in Foreign Exchange Intervention: Evidence from Official Bank of Canada High-Frequency Data2006Signaling Effects of Foreign Exchange Interventions and Expectation Heterogeneity among Traders2021A Market Microstructure Analysis of Foreign Exchange Intervention in Canada