Economic Incentives and Foster Care Placement

Abstract

Using micro‐level data on children entering foster care in 1998, we estimate how the financial compensation paid to foster caregivers affects the placement of foster children. Controlling for observable child and county characteristics as well as for unobservable state effects, our estimates indicate that a $100 increase in the basic monthly foster care payment reduces the number of children placed in group homes by 28.7%, with more children instead going to nonrelative foster homes. Further estimates indicate that the children moved out of group homes are equally likely to be placed in two‐parent and single‐parent homes, but they are disproportionately placed with caregivers who do not share the child's race or ethnicity. Finally, a $100 increase in foster care payment will decrease the number of times the average child is moved from one foster placement to another by 20%.

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