The First Motive to Justice: Hume’s Circle Argument Squared

Abstract

"Justice" is David Hume's most common term for respect for property. On John Locke Locke's view, the obligation to respect property is an original moral obligation imposed through a divinely instituted natural law that exists prior to and independent of human conventions. This chapter considers whether Hume does allow that there is a first virtuous motive to justice other than a sense of duty or whether he denies it. It also considers whether he should allow that there is such a motive in light of his survey of the available options. The chapter describes whether he can consistently allow such a motive within the constraints of his conative psychology. Commentators have typically characterized Hume's Circle Argument as involving irreconcilable contradictions or difficulties; but with respect to these three questions, at least, Hume's use of the Circle Argument can be squared.

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