Mechanism Games With Multiple Principals and Three or More Agents

Takuro Yamashita

46 citations0/0 files storedEconometrica

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Game Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Auction Theory and Applications

Abstract

We consider a class of mechanism games in which there are multiple principals and three or more agents. For a mechanism game in this class, a sort of folk theorem holds: there is a threshold value for each of the principals such that an allocation is achieved at a pure-strategy sequential equilibrium of the game if and only if (i) it is incentive compatible and (ii) it attains an expected utility for each principal that is greater than or equal to the threshold value for the principal.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 46 citations exist upstream.

References

2002The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games 2012Definable and Contractible Contracts

Cited by

2013A folk theorem for competing mechanisms

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.