Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties

Andrew T. Guzmán

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International Arbitration and Investment Law International Business and FDI International Law and Aviation

Abstract

A serious analysis of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and their implications for both investment levels and the distribution of the gains from investment is timely. BITs have become the dominant international vehicle through which investment is regulated.

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2008How International Law Works 2010The Law of Investment Treaties 2009Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and their Grand Bargain 2016Constructing Norms for Global Cybersecurity 2017The Political Economy of the Investment Treaty Regime 2012The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship 2013When the Claim Hits: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bounded Rational Learning 2010When BITs have some bite: The political-economic environment for bilateral investment treaties

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