Attention Allocation Over the Business Cycle

Abstract

The invisibility of information precludes a direct test of attention allocation theories. To surmount this obstacle, we develop a model that uses an observable variable { the state of the business cycle { to predict attention allocation. Attention allocation, in turn, predicts aggregate investment patterns. Because the theory begins and ends with observable variables, it becomes testable. We apply our theory to a large information- based industry, actively managed equity mutual funds, and study its investment choices and returns. Consistent with the theory, which predicts cyclical changes in attention allocation, we ¯nd that in recessions, funds' portfolios (1) covary more with aggregate payo®-relevant information, (2) exhibit more cross-sectional dispersion, and (3) gener- ate higher returns. The results suggest that some, but not all, fund managers process information in a value-maximizing way for their clients and that these skilled managers outperform others.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 20 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.