MERGERS WITH BUNDLING IN COMPLEMENTARY MARKETS*

Jay Pil Choi

76 citations0/0 files storedJournal of Industrial Economics

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Merger and Competition Analysis Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing Digital Platforms and Economics

Abstract

This paper develops a simple model to analyze the effects of mergers in complementary system markets when the merged firm is able to engage in bundling. In particular, I analyze the impact of (mixed) bundling on pricing decisions for existing generations of products and derive welfare implications of mergers. The basic model is then extended to analyze industry dynamics where the implications of mergers for innovation incentives and technical tying/compatibility decisions are explored. I also consider the possibility of counter‐merger and derive implications of the policy prescription that prohibits bundling as a condition for merger.

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References

1990Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm 1976Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly 2020Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth 2014Transaction Cost Economics 1989Multiproduct Monopoly, Commodity Bundling, and Correlation of Values 1989Chapter 3 Transaction cost economics 1989Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion 2004Bundling as an Entry Barrier

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