Time – The Emotional Asymmetry

Abstract

In this chapter on time-the emotional asymmetry, the author addresses two questions concerning future-bias. The first is with respect to the sorts of things are people future-biased. Do people want all things that they regard as bad to be in the past, or just some of them? Second, are people justified in being future-biased? The second question has received a good deal of attention from philosophers. The author aims to survey different answers to the question, and to give a sense of how things presently lie. A section presents some poor arguments for future-bias, including discussions on the shrinking block theory of time. It is also said that, even if four-dimensionalism is false, a charge of arbitrariness can be leveled at future-bias. Finally, the chapter presents a discussion on some incoherence arguments against future-bias.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 60 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.