Property Rights, Governance, and Economic Development

Jan U. Auerbach · Costas Azariadis

27 citations0/0 files storedReview of Development Economics

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Culture, Economy, and Development Studies Economic Theory and Institutions Corruption and Economic Development

Abstract

Abstract In this review article we give an intuitive account of why good institutions in general, and secure property rights in particular, matter for economic growth and development. We also discuss implications for good governance, defined as the efficient provision of property rights and other aspects of governance. Finally, we briefly touch on political institutions that might be conducive to good governance and thus economic development.

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1776An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 1999Why do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker than Others?1999The quality of government 2004Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development 1995INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: CROSS‐COUNTRY TESTS USING ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES 1993Corruption 2005Chapter 6 Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth 2005Unbundling Institutions

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