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Believing against the evidence: agency and the ethics of belief
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Cited by

  • 2018Believing for Practical Reasons170 cited
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  • 2018Equal treatment for belief155 cited
  • 2018A Combinatorial Argument against Practical Reasons for Belief152 cited
  • 2016Epistemic Normativity and Cognitive Agency106 cited
  • 2020The Game of Belief91 cited
  • 2017On the special insult of refusing testimony59 cited
  • 2017Rational hope48 cited
  • 2017Explaining doxastic transparency: aim, norm, or function?46 cited
  • 2022Belief, Agency, and Knowledge46 cited
  • 2019An Instrumentalist Account of How to Weigh Epistemic and Practical Reasons for Belief42 cited
  • 2019Kant and Crusius on Belief and Practical Justification37 cited
  • 2016Agency of belief and intention32 cited
  • 2016Defending Evidence‐Resistant Beliefs31 cited
  • 2019Weighing epistemic and practical reasons for belief31 cited
  • 2022Normative Reasons26 cited

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