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Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems
16 references·1 citing·42 second hop
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References

  • 1962College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage2,082 cited
  • 1982Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes1,307 cited
  • 1984The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory1,217 cited
  • 1987Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts1,039 cited
  • 195916. Acceptable Points in General Cooperative n-Person Games886 cited
  • n.d.The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design757 cited
  • 1985The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem467 cited
  • 1984Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching363 cited
  • 2004Strongly stable networks266 cited
  • 1997Stable Networks255 cited
  • 1988The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners217 cited
  • 1999Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores171 cited
  • 1999Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem160 cited
  • 1998Link formation in cooperative situations159 cited
  • 1989Credible coalitions and the core113 cited
  • 1985

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Conflict and Coincidence of Interest in Job Matching: Some New Results and Open Questions
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  • 2011Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms82 cited