Discussion of the definition of corruption has progressed little since Heidenheimer's groundbreaking distinction between definitions centred on public opinion, public office and public interest. All these definitions have been severely criticised. I suggest that underneath these traditional concepts of corruption lurks a much older one based on distributive justice – namely the ‘impartiality principle’, whereby a state ought to treat equally those who deserve equally. This principle provides a much more plausible reason for why the public condemns corruption than alternative approaches, and, moreover, it is recognised fairly universally: the implicit distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ is certainly neither as ‘modern’ nor as ‘Western’ as many have claimed. The universality of the principle of impartiality does not imply universality of its content: who deserves equally, or, alternatively, on which grounds discrimination is ruled out, will be answered differently at different periods in time and will vary from society to society. The impartiality principle provides a starting point for the discussion of both corruption in ‘traditional’ societies and contemporary political corruption – corruption involving violations of specific non-discrimination norms governing the access to the political process and the allocation of rights and resources. The impartiality principle calls for rule-bound administration and thus underpins the public office definition of corruption. A central element of the analysis of corruption is the study of specific non-discrimination norms and their comparison across time and place. This approach leads to a significant enrichment of the concept of corruption.
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