"General Rules" in Hume's Treatise

Abstract

IT COULD BE CONFIDENTLY ASSERTED in 1925 that Hume was longer living figure. x Stuart Hampshire records that when he began his philosophy studies in 1933, Hume 's conclusions were regarded at Oxford as extravagances of scepticism which no one could seriously accept. 2 Tha t virtually no Anglo-American philosopher would now share such opinions about Hume testifies not only to the general change in the philosophical climate but, in addition, it reflects transformation which has occurred in the interpretation of Hume ' s philosophy. In eitecting this transformation .much credit is due to the work of Norman Kemp Smith. Kemp Smith argued that preoccupation with Hume 's empiricist heritage and his scepticism had blinded scholars to the fundamentally constructive intent of his philosophy, and, indeed, that only f rom the perspective of his positive achievement was it possible to grasp the nature and significance of Humean scepticism. This paper, in keeping with the basic orientation of Kemp Smith, sets out central feature in the attempt to describe and assess Hume 's constructive, nonsceptical point of v i e w : Hume attributes to general rules a mighty on our actions and unders t n d i n g . . . (374). 4 This paper examines the Treatise to show that this was not just casual comment. To discuss the influence of general rules requires an examination of their character and the various aspects of action and understanding in which such rules function. The thesis to be developed can be stated briefly. In Book I Hume introduces two sorts of general rules which must be distinguished carefully. One type of rule describes propensity of the imagination to extend the scope

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