Using Subordinated Debt to Monitor Bank Holding Companies: Is it Feasible?Diana Hancock, Myron L. Kwast2001-10-01articleJournal of Financial Services Research120 citationsclosedNo readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.Credit Risk and Financial RegulationsBanking stability, regulation, efficiencyCorporate Finance and GovernanceAbstractNo abstract was published for this record.Citations in this libraryStored only when both papers are in the corpus — 120 citations exist upstream.References1993Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds2001Explaining the Rate Spread on Corporate Bonds1996Evidence of Bank Market Discipline in Subordinated Debenture Yields: 1983- 19911998Using Market Information in Prudential Bank Supervision: A Review of the U.S. Empirical Evidence2000Comparing Market and Supervisory Assessments of Bank Performance: Who Knows What When?1993Bondholder Losses in Leveraged Buyouts1989Bond Price Data and Bond Market Liquidity1988Market Discipline in Regulating Bank Risk: New Evidence from the Capital MarketsCited by2012Banking crises and market discipline: International evidence2005Which factors affect corporate bonds pricing? Empirical evidence from eurobonds primary market spreads2004Incorporating Equity Market Information into Supervisory Monitoring Models2011The End of Market Discipline? Investor Expectations of Implicit Government Guarantees2002Measures of the riskiness of banking organizations: Subordinated debt yields, risk-based capital, and examination ratings2016The changing relevance of accounting information to debt holders over time2010Effects of SFAS 133 on the Risk Relevance of Accounting Measures of Banks’ Derivative Exposures2015Market discipline by bank creditors during the 2008–2010 crisis