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A Defense of the Use of Intuitions in Philosophy
0 references·16 citing·48 second hopsampled
A Defense of the Use of Intuitions in Philosophy (2009)A Defense of the Use of Intuitions in Phi…A Conspicuous Art: Putting Gettier to the Test (2020)A Conspicuous Art: Putting Ge…On Evidence in Philosophy (2019)On Evidence in PhilosophyMoore against the New Skeptics (2019)Moore against the New SkepticsIntuitive expertise and intuitions about knowledge (2016)Intuitive expertise and intui…Philosophical Expertise (2014)Philosophical ExpertiseON NORMATIVITY AND EPISTEMIC INTUITIONS: FAILURE OF REPLICATION (2014)ON NORMATIVITY AND EPISTEMIC …Gender and Philosophical Intuition* (2014)Gender and Philosophical Intu…Vicious minds (2013)Vicious mindsThe Reliability of Armchair Intuitions (2013)The Reliability of Armchair I…Phenomenal Conservatism and the Principle of Credulity (2013)Phenomenal Conservatism and t…The Philosophical Personality Argument (2011)The Philosophical Personality…Philosophy's New Challenge: Experiments and Intentional Action (2011)Philosophy's New Challenge: E…How (not) to react to experimental philosophy (2010)How (not) to react to experim…Do you know more when it matters less? (2010)Do you know more when it matt…Intuitions are inclinations to believe (2009)Intuitions are inclinations t…A defense of intuitions (2007)A defense of intuitionsNaming and Necessity (1972)Mindset: the new psychology of success (2006)The weirdest people in the world? (2010)Quantifying the Gender Gap: An Empirical Study of the Underrepresentation of Women in Philosophy (2012)Expert or Esoteric? Philosophers Attribute Knowledge Differently Than All Other Academics (2020)Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition (2021)Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? (1963)Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge (1976)The Philosophy of Philosophy (2007)Some hope for intuitions: A reply to Weinberg (2010)Contingency Anxiety and the Epistemology of Disagreement (2015)Experimental Philosophy and the Philosophical Tradition (2016)Self-Perception Theory (1972)Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes. (1977)Unrealistic optimism about future life events. (1980)Knowledge, Stakes, and Mistakes (2013)Skeptical Appeal: The Source‐Content Bias (2014)Estimating the Reproducibility of Experimental Philosophy (2018)Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (1974)Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (1975)Demoralizing causation (2013)In Defense of a Broad Conception of Experimental Philosophy (2013)Debunking Arguments in Ethics (2018)Knowledge and Its Limits (2000)Knowledge and its Limits (2002)Moral Perception and the Contents of Experience (2015)Intuitions are Used as Evidence in Philosophy (2017)Why Most Published Research Findings Are False (2005)Why Most Published Research Findings Are False (2005)The Logic of Scientific Discovery (2013)Is our naïve theory of time dynamical? (2019)Philosophical Intuitions Are Surprisingly Robust Across Demographic Differences (2019)Descartes’s Schism, Locke’s Reunion: Completing the Pragmatic Turn in Epistemology (2020)Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (1998)Knowledge attributions in iterated fake barn cases (2017)Lottery judgments: A philosophical and experimental study (2017)Demographic Differences in Philosophical Intuition: a Reply to Joshua Knobe (2022)Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making (2005)What Can We Do, When We Do Metaphysics? (2017)Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? (1963)Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate? (2000)Knowledge and suberogatory assertion (2013)Knowledge and the Gettier Problem (2016)MATERIALISM AND QUALIA: THE EXPLANATORY GAP (1983)An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (2017)Ontological Arguments (2020)Are Intuitions Treated as Evidence? Cases from Political Philosophy* (2022)Understanding philosophy (2022)
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Cited by

  • 2014Gender and Philosophical Intuition*166 cited
  • 2014Philosophical Expertise138 cited
  • 2009Intuitions are inclinations to believe137 cited
  • 2020A Conspicuous Art: Putting Gettier to the Test129 cited
  • 2016Intuitive expertise and intuitions about knowledge120 cited
  • 2010How (not) to react to experimental philosophy114 cited
  • 2014ON NORMATIVITY AND EPISTEMIC INTUITIONS: FAILURE OF REPLICATION102 cited
  • 2010Do you know more when it matters less?98 cited
  • 2011Philosophy's New Challenge: Experiments and Intentional Action86 cited
  • 2019On Evidence in Philosophy79 cited
  • 2007A defense of intuitions74 cited
  • 2013Vicious minds72 cited
  • 2019Moore against the New Skeptics62 cited
  • 2013Phenomenal Conservatism and the Principle of Credulity61 cited
  • 2011The Philosophical Personality Argument57 cited
  • 2013The Reliability of Armchair Intuitions55 cited

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