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The Price of Truth: Frugality in Truthful Mechanisms
16 references·8 citing·22 second hop
The Price of Truth: Frugality in Truthful Mechanisms (2003)The Price of Truth: Frugality in Truthful…Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions (2008)Truthful approximation mechan…An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects (2004)An Efficient Ascending-Bid Au…An Approximate Truthful Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions with Single Parameter Agents (2004)An Approximate Truthful Mecha…Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions (2002)Truth revelation in approxima…The Package Assignment Model (2002)The Package Assignment ModelTruthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents (2001)Truthful mechanisms for one-p…Algorithms, games, and the internet (2001)Algorithms, games, and the in…Algorithmic Mechanism Design (2001)Algorithmic Mechanism DesignIterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice (2000)Iterative Combinatorial Aucti…Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms (2000)Computationally feasible VCG …Truth Revelation in Rapid, Approximately Efficient Combinatorial Auctions (1999)Truth Revelation in Rapid, Ap…Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract) (1999)Algorithmic mechanism design …A Course in Game Theory (1994)A Course in Game TheoryIncentives in Teams (1973)Incentives in TeamsMultipart pricing of public goods (1971)Multipart pricing of public g…COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS,…Price of anarchy for auction revenue (2014)Price of anarchy for auction …Mechanism Design and Approximation (2014)Mechanism Design and Approxim…Auctions for social lending: A theoretical analysis (2013)Auctions for social lending: …On the Approximability of Budget Feasible Mechanisms (2011)On the Approximability of Bud…Mechanisms for complement-free procurement (2011)Mechanisms for complement-fre…Revenue submodularity (2009)Revenue submodularityCollusion-resistant mechanisms for single-parameter agents (2005)Collusion-resistant mechanism…How much can taxes help selfish routing? (2003)How much can taxes help selfi…Optimal Auction Design (1981)A survey on networking games in telecommunications (2004)Worst-case equilibria (2009)A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (1982)Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations (2001)Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding (2002)The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction (2005)RATIONAL CHOICE AND THE FRAMING OF DECISIONS (1988)Theory of games and economic behavior (2019)Worst-Case Equilibria (1999)The Digitization of Word of Mouth: Promise and Challenges of Online Feedback Mechanisms (2003)The Price of Fairness (2011)Social Choice and Individual Values. (1951)Towards a characterization of truthful combinatorial auctions (2004)Complexity of Mechanism Design (2002)Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing (2010)Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities (2005)Approximate mechanism design without money (2009)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Putting Auction Theory to Work (2004)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)2. Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research (1995)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1961COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS7,719 cited
  • 1994A Course in Game Theory5,468 cited
  • 1973Incentives in Teams3,334 cited
  • 1971Multipart pricing of public goods3,266 cited
  • 2001Algorithmic Mechanism Design1,331 cited
  • 2001Algorithms, games, and the internet1,107 cited
  • 2004An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects727 cited
  • 2002Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions658 cited
  • 2001Truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents521 cited
  • 1999Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)478 cited
  • 2000Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice369 cited
  • 2000Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms325 cited
  • 2008Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions320 cited
  • 2002The Package Assignment Model305 cited
  • 1999Truth Revelation in Rapid, Approximately Efficient Combinatorial Auctions223 cited
  • 2004An Approximate Truthful Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions with Single Parameter Agents150 cited

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Cited by

  • 2014Mechanism Design and Approximation119 cited
  • 2005Collusion-resistant mechanisms for single-parameter agents84 cited
  • 2011On the Approximability of Budget Feasible Mechanisms77 cited
  • 2011Mechanisms for complement-free procurement61 cited
  • 2003How much can taxes help selfish routing?60 cited
  • 2013Auctions for social lending: A theoretical analysis47 cited
  • 2014Price of anarchy for auction revenue45 cited
  • 2009Revenue submodularity42 cited