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Rigging the lobbying process: An application of the all-pay auction · Study

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ChapterRigging the lobbying process: An application of the all-pay auction

Michael Roy Baye2008

Chapter2008

Rigging the lobbying process: An application of the all-pay auction

Michael Roy Baye · Dan Kovenock · Casper G. de Vries

491 citations·0/0 files stored·Springer eBooks

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Auction Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Political Influence and Corporate Strategies

Abstract

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Citations in this library

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 491 citations exist upstream.

References

1982Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society 2001Efficient Rent Seeking 1986The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory 1989POLITICALLY CONTESTABLE RENTS AND TRANSFERS*

Cited by

1999Auctionin Entry into Tournaments 2003Optimal Design of Research Contests 1997An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction 1996AUCTIONS: AN INTRODUCTION 2008Multi-battle contests 1999Orchestrating Rent Seeking Contests 2001The solution to the Tullock rent-seeking game when R > 2: Mixed-strategy equilibria and mean dissipation rates 2015Policy Influence and Private Returns from Lobbying in the Energy Sector

Details

Year2008

Typechapter

Published2008-01-01

VenueSpringer eBooks

Languageen

Citations491

Files0 public / 0

ShelfAuction Theory and Applications

Identifiers

doi10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_18

openalex_workW1539324953

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