Determinants of Central Bank Independence and Governance: Problems and Policy Implications

Abstract

\n\t\t\t\t\tCentral bank independence and governance (CBIG) is a term subject to conflicting definitions and so its related studies are difficult to compare. This paper therefore focuses on developing of a more useable definition, and an index model identifying the determinants of independence and governance and their possible policy implications. It also examines various independence measurement tools such as ranking and index. The index model resulting centres on key central bank independence and corporate governance issues, such as, legal aspects, political aspects, price stability objective aspects, exchange rate policy aspects, monetary policy and deficit financing aspects and finally, transparency and accountability aspects. \n\t\t\t\t

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