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Agency Problems in Law Enforcement: Theory and Application to the U.S. Coast Guard
16 references·1 citing·37 second hop
Agency Problems in Law Enforcement: Theory and Application to the U.S. Coast Guard (2005)Agency Problems in Law Enforcement: Theor…Regulation and Compliance Motivations: Examining Different Approaches (2005)Regulation and Compliance Mot…Compliance Motivations: Affirmative and Negative Bases (2004)Compliance Motivations: Affir…The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law (2000)The Economic Theory of Public…The Provision of Incentives in Firms (1999)The Provision of Incentives i…The Enforcement of Pollution Control Laws: Inspections, Violations, and Self-Reporting (1998)The Enforcement of Pollution …Responsive Regulation (1992)Responsive RegulationIncentive Contracts and Performance Measurement (1992)Incentive Contracts and Perfo…Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior (1991)Optimal Law Enforcement with …Cooperation, Deterrence, and the Ecology of Regulatory Enforcement (1984)Cooperation, Deterrence, and …Economically Optimal Performance Evaluation and Control Systems (1980)Economically Optimal Performa…Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship (1979)Risk Sharing and Incentives i…Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information (1979)Optimal incentive contracts w…Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Moral Hazard and ObservabilityThe Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization (1976)The Optimal Structure of Ince…The Optimum Enforcement of Laws (1970)The Optimum Enforcement of La…Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach (1968)Crime and Punishment: An Econ…Density and Disasters: Economics of Urban Hazard Risk (2011)Density and Disasters: Econom…Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1972)The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. (1973)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)Moral Hazard in Teams (1982)Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)Agency Costs, Net Worth, And Business Fluctuations (1988)An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation (1971)Human Capital, Effort, and the Sexual Division of Labor (1985)Legislative leviathan: party government in the House (1993)Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization (1996)Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm (1980)Outside directors and CEO turnover (1988)Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives (1990)Inequality and Economic Growth: The Perspective of the New Growth Theories (1999)Motivation, Knowledge Transfer, and Organizational Forms (2000)Incentives and Prosocial Behavior (2006)Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention (1962)Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory (1962)What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity (1962)Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis (1972)Advertising as Information (1974)Adolescence-limited and life-course-persistent antisocial behavior: A developmental taxonomy. (1993)Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. (1984)Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration (2000)Full Disclosure (2007)A mutualistic approach to morality: The evolution of fairness by partner choice (2013)An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (2017)Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information (1981)Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation (1973)Social License and Environmental Protection: Why Businesses Go Beyond Compliance (2004)Performance Pay and Productivity (2000)Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts (2003)Identity and the Economics of Organizations (2005)Political Trust and Trustworthiness (2000)An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism (2001)Varieties of Capitalism (2001)
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References

  • 1968Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach13,984 cited
  • 1979Moral Hazard and Observability8,358 cited
  • 1999The Provision of Incentives in Firms3,337 cited
  • 1992Responsive Regulation2,482 cited
  • 1979Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship1,285 cited
  • 2000The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law1,190 cited
  • 1970The Optimum Enforcement of Laws1,147 cited
  • 1992Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement1,085 cited
  • 1979Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information942 cited
  • 1976The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization870 cited
  • 1991Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior406 cited
  • 1980Economically Optimal Performance Evaluation and Control Systems354 cited
  • 1998The Enforcement of Pollution Control Laws: Inspections, Violations, and Self-Reporting313 cited
  • 1984Cooperation, Deterrence, and the Ecology of Regulatory Enforcement272 cited
  • 2004Compliance Motivations: Affirmative and Negative Bases224 cited
  • 2005Regulation and Compliance Motivations: Examining Different Approaches

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219 cited

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  • 2011Density and Disasters: Economics of Urban Hazard Risk100 cited