The ``Power of the Purse'' and its Implications for Bureaucratic Policy-MakingMichael M. Ting2001-03-01articlePublic Choice36 citationsclosedNo readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.Public Policy and Administration ResearchFiscal Policies and Political EconomyGame Theory and Voting SystemsAbstractNo abstract was published for this record.Citations in this libraryStored only when both papers are in the corpus — 36 citations exist upstream.References1979Moral Hazard and Observability1963A Behavioral Theory of the Firm1971Bureaucracy and Representative Government1964Richard M. Cyert & James G. March, A Behavioral Theory of The Firm, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1963, 332 s.1987Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control1984Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information1990Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring1996The Making of Economic PolicyCited by2002Expertise, Subversion, and Bureaucratic Discretion2004The Appointments Dilemma2011The Lengthened Shadow of Another Institution? Ideal Point Estimates for the Executive Branch and Congress2011The Complications of Controlling Agency Time Discretion: FDA Review Deadlines and Postmarket Drug Safety2009Politics, Delegation, and Bureaucracy2007Regulatory Quality Under Imperfect Oversight2016Working smart and hard? Agency effort, judicial review, and policy precision2008Contrast and Foundation of the Public Oversight Roles of the U.S. Government Accountability Office and the U.K. National Audit Office