Products Liability, Consumer Misperceptions, and Market Power

Abstract

This paper compares alternative liability rules for allo- cating losses from defective products when consumers underestimate these losses and producers may have some market power.If producers do not have any market power, the rule of strict liability 'leads to both the first-best accident probability and industry output.If producers do have some market power, strict liability still leads to the first-best accident probability, but there will now be too little output of the industry.It is shown that if market power is sufficiently large, a negligence rule is preferable.Under this rule, firms can still be induced to choose the first-best accident probability, but now the remaining damages are borne by consumers.Since consumers underestimate these damages, they buy more than under strict liability.However, there is a limit to how much the negligence rule can encourage extra consumption.It is shown that if market power is sufficiently large, the rule of no liability may then be preferred to the negligence rule.Without any liability imposed, producers will not choose the first-best accident probability.However, this may be more than compensated for by the increased output of the industry.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 123 citations exist upstream.