DIFFERENCE GAMES AND POLICY EVALUATION: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Aart J. de Zeeuw · Frederick van der Ploeg

49 citations0/0 files storedOxford Economic Papers

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Game Theory and Applications Evaluation and Performance Assessment Innovative Teaching Methodologies in Social Sciences

Abstract

* This paper arose from an earlier paper, entitled Non-cooperative strategies for dynamic policy games and the problem of time inconsistency. A comment , and has benefited from the comments of three anonymous referees, Andries Brandsma and the editorial advice of Peter Sinclair

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References

1977Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans 1976Econometric policy evaluation: A critique 1982Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations 1975Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games 1982Reputation and imperfect information 1978On the Time Consistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary Economy 19903. Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy 1981Duopoly Models with Consistent Conjectures

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2007A two-level dynamic game of carbon emission trading between Russia, China, and Annex B countries

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