Equilibrium in multicandidate probabilistic spatial votingTse‐Min Lin, James M. Enelow, Han Dorussen1999-01-01articlePublic Choice154 citationsclosedNo readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.Game Theory and Voting SystemsElectoral Systems and Political ParticipationOpinion Dynamics and Social InfluenceAbstractNo abstract was published for this record.Citations in this libraryStored only when both papers are in the corpus — 154 citations exist upstream.References1958An Economic Theory of Democracy.1959The Theory of Committees and Elections.1984Fundamental methods of mathematical economics1985The Spatial Theory of Voting: An Introduction.1967A Notion of Equilibrium and Its Possibility Under Majority Rule1975The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Reconsidered: Some New Developments in the Theory of Spatial Competition1992Probabilistic Voting Theory1977Equilibrium in spatial voting: The median voter result is an artifactCited by2004Equilibrium in the Spatial ‘Valence’ Model of Politics2002Centrifugal Incentives in Multi-Candidate Elections2012Missing Links in Party-System Polarization: How Institutions and Voters Matter2016Strategic Ambiguity of Party Positions in Multi-Party Competition2003Critical Elections and Political Realignments in the USA: 1860–20002005Modeling the interaction of parties, activists and voters: Why is the political center so empty?2008Research Note: On the inverse relationship between votes and proximity for niche parties2010Party-System Extremism in Majoritarian and Proportional Electoral Systems