Political Pressure on Central Banks: The Case of the Czech National Bank

Adam Geršl

13 citations0/0 files storedRePEc: Research Papers in Economics

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Monetary Policy and Economic Impact Banking stability, regulation, efficiency European Monetary and Fiscal Policies

Abstract

As the independence of national central banks in the European Union is one of the main institutional features of the monetary constitution of the EU, the paper tries to find out whether central banks are factually independent in their decisions about interest rates if they face political pressure. The Havrilesky (1993) methodology of the political pressure on central banks is applied to the Czech National Bank, a central bank of one of the new EU Member States, in order to test whether the conducted monetary policy has been influenced by political pressure from various interest groups.

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References

1975The Political Business Cycle 1977Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy 2000Political Economy in Macroeconomics 1992Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence 1979Political Control of the Economy.1995Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy 2003Public Choice III 1992Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility

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2009A Road with Multiple Lanes: The Journeys of the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia towards Euro Adoption

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