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Board Interlocking in Brazil: Directors' Participation in Multiple Companies and its Effect on Firm Value
16 references·0 citing·37 second hop
Board Interlocking in Brazil: Directors' Participation in Multiple Companies and its Effect on Firm Value (2007)Board Interlocking in Brazil: Directors' …Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors? (2012)Are Busy Boards Effective Mon…Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors? (2006)Are Busy Boards Effective Mon…In Search of New Foundations (2000)In Search of New FoundationsCEO Involvement in the Selection of New Board Members: An Empirical Analysis (1999)CEO Involvement in the Select…Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis (1998)Management Ownership and Mark…The Mechanisms of Governance (1997)The Mechanisms of GovernanceWhat Do Interlocks Do? An Analysis, Critique, and Assessment of Research on Interlocking Directorates (1996)What Do Interlocks Do? An Ana…A Simple Approximation of Tobin's q (1994)A Simple Approximation of Tob…A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance (1992)A Modest Proposal for Improve…Agents without Principles? The Spread of the Poison Pill through the Intercorporate Network (1991)Agents without Principles? Th…Management ownership and market valuation (1988)Management ownership and mark…Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition (1985)Corporate Governance and the …Size and Composition of Corporate Boards of Directors: The Organization and its Environment (1972)Size and Composition of Corpo…Liquidity Preference as Behavior Towards Risk (1958)Liquidity Preference as Behav…Leadership in administration (1957)Leadership in administrationLeadership in Administration (1956)Leadership in AdministrationTheory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm (1980)Separation of Ownership and Control (1983)A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997)Law and Finance (1998)Corporate Ownership Around the World (1999)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)An Empirical Analysis of the Relation between the Board of Director Composition and Financial Statement Fraud (1997)Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance (1999)The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields (1983)Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness (1985)Social Movements and Networks (2003)The iron cage revisited institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields (2004)Demographic Diversity in the Boardroom: Mediators of the Board Diversity–Firm Performance Relationship (2009)Dynamics of Dyads in Social Networks: Assortative, Relational, and Proximity Mechanisms (2010)Organizational Legitimacy: Social Values and Organizational Behavior (1975)The External Control of Organizations. (1978)STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO INSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES (1991)Exchange and Power in Social Life (2017)The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities (1973)The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns (1992)Corporate Governance and Firm Performance (2007)The Gender and Ethnic Diversity of US Boards and Board Committees and Firm Financial Performance (2010)The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey (2010)The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems (1993)Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors (1996)Boards: Does one size fit all☆ (2007)Corporate Governance, Board Diversity, and Firm Value (2003)How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value? (2005)EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKETS: A REVIEW OF THEORY AND EMPIRICAL WORK* (1970)Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests (1973)THE VALUATION OF RISK ASSETS AND THE SELECTION OF RISKY INVESTMENTS IN STOCK PORTFOLIOS AND CAPITAL BUDGETS**This paper is another in a series of interrelated theoretical and statistical studies of corporate financial and investment policies being made under grants from the Rockefeller Foundation, and more recently the Ford Foundation, to the Harvard Business School. The generous support for this work is most gratefully acknowledged. The author is also much indebted to his colleagues Professors Bishop, Christenson, Kahr, Raiffa, and (especially) Schlaifer, for extensive discussion and commentary on an earlier draft of this paper; but responsibility for any errors or imperfections remains strictly his own.[Professor Sharpe's paper, “Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk” (Journal of Finance, September 1964) appeared after this paper was in final form and on its way to the printers. My first section, which parallels the first half of his paper (with corresponding conclusions), sets the algebraic framework for sections II, III and VI, (which have no counterpart in his paper) and for section IV on the equilibrium prices of risk assets, concerning which our results differ significantly for reasons which will be explored elsewhere. Sharpe does not take up the capital budgeting problem developed in section V below.] (1975)The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives (1968)Strategic management and economics (1991)Pathologies of Accountability: ICANN and the Challenge of “Multiple Accountabilities Disorder” (2005)The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life (1983)Identity and the Economics of Organizations (2005)
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References

  • 1988Management ownership and market valuation6,910 cited
  • 1958Liquidity Preference as Behavior Towards Risk3,916 cited
  • 1992A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance2,776 cited
  • 1994A Simple Approximation of Tobin's q2,458 cited
  • 1957Leadership in administration2,296 cited
  • 1972Size and Composition of Corporate Boards of Directors: The Organization and its Environment1,994 cited
  • 1956Leadership in Administration1,854 cited
  • 1996What Do Interlocks Do? An Analysis, Critique, and Assessment of Research on Interlocking Directorates1,782 cited
  • 1985Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition1,742 cited
  • 2006Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?1,675 cited
  • 2000In Search of New Foundations1,503 cited
  • 1991Agents without Principles? The Spread of the Poison Pill through the Intercorporate Network1,380 cited
  • 1999CEO Involvement in the Selection of New Board Members: An Empirical Analysis1,297 cited
  • 1998Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis1,108 cited
  • 2012Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?1,051 cited

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  • 1997The Mechanisms of Governance981 cited
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