A Rubinesque theory of decision

Abstract

<!-- *** Custom HTML *** --> We generalize a set of axioms introduced by Rubin, A weak system of axioms for “rational” behavior and the nonseparability of utility from prior, Statistics & Decisions, to the case of partial preference. That is, we consider cases in which not all uncertain acts are comparable to each other. We demonstrate some relations between these axioms and a decision theory based on sets of probability/utility pairs. We illustrate by example how comparisons solely between pairs of acts is not sufficient to distinguish between decision makers who base their choices on distinct sets of probability/utility pairs.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 20 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.