Risk Aversion as Attitude towards Probabilities: A Paradox

James C. Cox · Vjollca Sadiraj

2 citations0/0 files storedRePEc: Research Papers in Economics

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Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics Risk Perception and Management Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Abstract

Theories of decision under risk that challenge expected utility theory model risk attitudes at least partly with transformation of probabilities. We explain how attributing risk aversion (partly or wholly) to attitude towards probabilities, can produce extreme probability distortions that imply paradoxical risk aversion.

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1988Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk 1992Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty 1953Le Comportement de l'Homme Rationnel devant le Risque: Critique des Postulats et Axiomes de l'Ecole Americaine 1982A theory of anticipated utility 1954The theory of decision making.1992Choice Under Uncertainty: Problems Solved and Unsolved 2010Prospect Theory: For Risk and Ambiguity 2013Risk aversion and expected-utility theory: A calibration theorem

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