Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem

1979-01-01articleEconometrica1,983 citationsclosed

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

Game Theory and Voting Systems Game Theory and Applications Auction Theory and Applications

Abstract

Collective choice problems are studied from the Bayesian viewpoint. It is shown that the set of expected utility allocations which are feasible with incentive-compatible mechanisms is compact and convex, and includes the equilibrium allocations for all other mechanisms. The generalized Nash solution proposed by Harsanyi and Selten is then applied to this set to define a bargaining solution for Bayesian collective choice problems.

Citations in this library

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 1,983 citations exist upstream.

References

1950The Bargaining Problem

1973Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result

1975Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions

1968Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points

Cited by

2001The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model

1984The New Economics of Organization

2009Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations

1982Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs

2002Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics

1991Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships

1979The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility

1998Money Is Memory