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Managerial Discretion, Agency Costs, and Capital Structure
16 references·1 citing·45 second hop
Managerial Discretion, Agency Costs, and Capital Structure (2008)Managerial Discretion, Agency Costs, and …Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in the United States (2009)Extreme Governance: An Analys…Growth Opportunities and the Choice of Leverage, Debt Maturity, and Covenants (2007)Growth Opportunities and the …Managerial incentives and risk-taking☆ (2005)Managerial incentives and ris…Taxes and Corporate Finance: A Review (2003)Taxes and Corporate Finance: …CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment (2002)CEO Overconfidence and Corpor…An EBIT‐Based Model of Dynamic Capital Structure (2001)An EBIT‐Based Model of Dynami…Does Option Compensation Increase Managerial Risk Appetite? (2000)Does Option Compensation Incr…Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective (1999)Managerial Incentive Problems…Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure (1998)Theory of the Firm: Manageria…Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers (1996)Agency costs of free cash flo…Top-Management Compensation and Capital Structure (1993)Top-Management Compensation a…Portfolio Considerations in Valuing Executive Compensation (1991)Portfolio Considerations in V…Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives (1987)Aggregation and Linearity in …Determinants of corporate borrowing (1977)Determinants of corporate bor…Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Theory of the firm: Manageria…An Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model (1973)An Intertemporal Capital Asse…Macroeconomic Conditions and a Firm's Investment Decisions (2013)Macroeconomic Conditions and …The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment (1958)Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares (1961)Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have (1984)The Capital Structure Puzzle (1984)A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997)FINANCIAL RATIOS, DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS AND THE PREDICTION OF CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY (1968)The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities (1973)Boards: Does one size fit all☆ (2007)Are Overconfident CEOs Better Innovators? (2012)Corporate Immunity to the COVID-19 Pandemic (2020)Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)Agency costs and innovation (1989)Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives (1997)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism (1970)Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm (1980)The Digitization of Word of Mouth: Promise and Challenges of Online Feedback Mechanisms (2003)Competition and Innovation: An Inverted U Relationship (2008)Portfolio Performance Manipulation and Manipulation-proof Performance MeasuresOptimum consumption and portfolio rules in a continuous-time model (1971)High‐Water Marks and Hedge Fund Management Contracts (2003)An econometric model of serial correlation and illiquidity in hedge fund returns (2004)Brownian Motion and Stochastic Calculus (2007)CAPITAL ASSET PRICES: A THEORY OF MARKET EQUILIBRIUM UNDER CONDITIONS OF RISK* (1964)EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKETS: A REVIEW OF THEORY AND EMPIRICAL WORK* (1970)THE VALUATION OF RISK ASSETS AND THE SELECTION OF RISKY INVESTMENTS IN STOCK PORTFOLIOS AND CAPITAL BUDGETS**This paper is another in a series of interrelated theoretical and statistical studies of corporate financial and investment policies being made under grants from the Rockefeller Foundation, and more recently the Ford Foundation, to the Harvard Business School. The generous support for this work is most gratefully acknowledged. The author is also much indebted to his colleagues Professors Bishop, Christenson, Kahr, Raiffa, and (especially) Schlaifer, for extensive discussion and commentary on an earlier draft of this paper; but responsibility for any errors or imperfections remains strictly his own.[Professor Sharpe's paper, “Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk” (Journal of Finance, September 1964) appeared after this paper was in final form and on its way to the printers. My first section, which parallels the first half of his paper (with corresponding conclusions), sets the algebraic framework for sections II, III and VI, (which have no counterpart in his paper) and for section IV on the equilibrium prices of risk assets, concerning which our results differ significantly for reasons which will be explored elsewhere. Sharpe does not take up the capital budgeting problem developed in section V below.] (1975)Conditional Heteroskedasticity in Asset Returns: A New Approach (1991)The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns (1992)Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds (1993)GROWTH, BETA AND AGENCY COSTS AS DETERMINANTS OF DIVIDEND PAYOUT RATIOS (1982)Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends (1984)Corporate performance and managerial remuneration (1985)The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems (1993)What Do We Know about Capital Structure? Some Evidence from International Data (1995)The Nature of the Firm (1937)Separation of Ownership and Control (1983)Law and Finance (1998)The Maturity Structure of Corporate Debt (1995)The Determinants of Credit Spread Changes (2001)Corporate Yield Spreads: Default Risk or Liquidity? New Evidence from the Credit Default Swap Market (2004)Do Tests of Capital Structure Theory Mean What They Say? (2007)Managing Resources: Linking Unique Resources, Management, and Wealth Creation in Family Firms (2003)R2 around the world: New theory and new tests☆ (2005)Over-investment of free cash flow (2006)
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References

  • 1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure71,441 cited
  • 1977Determinants of corporate borrowing13,160 cited
  • 1996Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers9,308 cited
  • 1973An Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model6,557 cited
  • 1999Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective3,169 cited
  • 2005Managerial incentives and risk-taking☆2,924 cited
  • 1987Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives2,870 cited
  • 1998Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure2,749 cited
  • 2001An EBIT‐Based Model of Dynamic Capital Structure957 cited
  • 2000Does Option Compensation Increase Managerial Risk Appetite?926 cited
  • 2002CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment905 cited
  • 1991Portfolio Considerations in Valuing Executive Compensation844 cited
  • 1993Top-Management Compensation and Capital Structure813 cited
  • 2003Taxes and Corporate Finance: A Review786 cited
  • 2007Growth Opportunities and the Choice of Leverage, Debt Maturity, and Covenants762 cited
  • 2009

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Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in the United States
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  • 2013Macroeconomic Conditions and a Firm's Investment Decisions19 cited