Hume on Space (and Time)

Abstract

In the context of the Scientific Revolution and Newton’s breakthrough regarding the law of gravity, Hume feels obligated to begin the Treatise with The Ideas of Space and Time . Whereas he initially argues that our simple , i.e. unextended impressions always precede our ideas, but now he contends that our ideas consist of the “whole” coming before the “parts.” Hume further argues that our perceptions “exist nowhere,” meaning they are mental. Although we do sense physical objects of sense and touch, nevertheless our ideas of space reduce to simple, i.e. unextended minima sensibilia , consisting of both minima visibilia and minima tangibilia . This is a direct consequence of Hume’s conviction that his mental perceptions are not materially extended in space. And Hume believes that unless Newton’s contribution is philosophically grounded in a meaningful account of space (and time), it will be suspect. (Kant later similarly begins his Critique with the intuitions of space and time.) But Hume’s “idealist” interpretation of space (and time) is due to his acquaintance with the famous Leibniz-Clarke correspondence, with Clarke defending Newton. Newton believes that God created both absolute space and time as quasi-substances. By contrast, Leibniz argues they are relative to the human capacity of ordering petites perceptions, Hume’s minima sensibilia , within consciousness. In short, Hume’s argument essentially follows Leibniz’s idealist lead.

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