this work references cited by second hopReferences
- 1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure71,441 cited
- 1983Separation of Ownership and Control19,446 cited
- 1996Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization9,565 cited
- 1983Agency Problems and Residual Claims4,877 cited
- 1984Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms2,936 cited
- 1980The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise2,553 cited
- 1985Corporate performance and managerial remuneration1,756 cited
- 1975Bureaucrats and Politicians1,028 cited
- 1984The congressional-bureaucratic system: a principal agent perspective (with applications to the SEC)503 cited
- 1974Toward a general theory of managerial discretion469 cited
- 1975The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective420 cited
- 1983Bureaucrats, Legislators, and the Size of Government261 cited
- 1975The Equilibrium Size of a Budget-maximizing Bureau: A Note on Niskanen's Theory of Bureaucracy237 cited
- 1968Особая экономика бюрократии (The Peculiar Economics of Bureaucracy)221 cited
- 1985The self-serving management hypothesis174 cited
Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work