Unsolved dilemmas: the concept of matter in the history of philosophy and in contemporary physics

Abstract

By the end of the modern period, a particular world view had become firmly entrenched in the public understanding. Unlike most philosophical positions, which are sharply distinguished from scientific theories, this world view was widely seen as a direct implication of science, and even as the sine qua non for all scientific activity. For shorthand, let's call this view “materialism.” Materialism consisted of five central theses: (1) Matter is the fundamental constituent of the natural world. (2) Forces act on matter. (3) The fundamental material particles or “atoms” – together with the fundamental physical forces, whatever they turn out to be – determine the motion of all objects in nature. Thus materialism entails determinism. (4) All more complex objects that we encounter in the natural world are aggregates of these fundamental particles, and their motions and behaviors can ultimately be understood in terms of the fundamental physical forces acting on them. Nothing exists that is not the product of these same particles and forces. In particular, there are no uniquely biological forces (vitalism or “entelechies”), no conscious forces (dualism), and no divine forces (what came to be known as supernaturalism). Thus materialism implied the exclusion of dualism, downward causation (Bøgh Andersen et al., 2000), and divine activity. […]

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