Causation, Projection, Inference, and Agency

Abstract

This chapter explores the prospects for broadly projectivist accounts of causation. It argues that a Hume-style account, based on the projection of our inferential practices, is inferior to a Ramsey-style account that is based on the projection of degrees of belief from the perspective of the deliberating agent, since the latter but not the former can provide a satisfactory account of the asymmetry of causation. The chapter further argues that rooting a projectivist account of causation in a broadly Ramseyan account of conditionals provides independent motivation for accepting a broadly non-cognitivist view about causal claims. Finally, it offers a brief discussion of how the difference between Ramsey's and Lewis's approach to conditionals plays out in their accounts of causation.

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